The particular circumstances in which the issue arose concerned a standing order adopted by Tower Hamlets Council which provided that where a planning application was deferred, only councillors present at the previous meeting would be able to vote on the application. However, the judgment also has wider implications for the lawfulness of other voting restrictions commonly applied by local authorities, including standing orders which prevent members from voting in circumstances where they have missed the officer’s presentation or debate at a single meeting.

The Appellant argued that the right of elected councillors to vote is sacrosanct and that preventing a member of the planning committee from voting comprised a form of indirect disenfranchisement of the constituents they represent. A councillor’s right to vote was said to be fundamental to the scheme of the Local Government Act 1972 (LGA1972) and of such importance that it could only be restricted by clear words in primary legislation.

Tower Hamlets Council argued, and the Supreme Court accepted, that the power of local authorities to make standing orders for the “regulation of their proceedings and business” in Sch.12, paragraph 42 of the LGA 1972 encompasses a power to regulate the circumstances in which councillors will be entitled to vote. The effect of the statutory provisions dealing with meetings and voting, such as para 39 of Schedule 12, must be considered in the context of the general background rules regarding the entitlement of a councillor to vote and in the context of the underlying purpose of the provision, which is to enable a local authority to take lawful decisions.

A copy of the judgment can be found here: R (on the application of The Spitalfields Historic Building Trust) (Appellant) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets and another (Respondents)

Hereward Phillpot KC and Isabella Tafur appeared for the First Respondent, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.