The Supreme Court will consider whether on an application for a certificate of appropriate alternative development (CAAD) under s. 17 of the Land Compensation Act 1961, the decision-maker ought, when determining the development that could reasonably be expected to be granted planning permission under s. 14, to take into account other applications for, or grants of, CAADs as though they were planning applications or decisions, or material planning considerations.
The Court of Appeal previously upheld the Lands Chamber’s decision that applications for, or grants of, CAADs are not to be treated as notional applications for, or grants of, planning permission or as material planning considerations. The Court of Appeal further held that it is an inevitable consequence of the cancellation assumption that no CAAD applications on other sites could have been made, with the effect that the issue of CAADs on different sites must be entirely disregarded.
The Supreme Court case details can be found here.
Richard Glover QC acts for the Fourth Respondent (Birmingham City University).