The particular circumstances in which the issue arose concerned a standing order adopted by Tower Hamlets Council which prevented members of the development committee from voting on deferred applications where they had not been present at the previous meeting at which the application was considered. However, the judgment will have wider implications for the lawfulness of other voting restrictions commonly applied by local authorities, including standing orders which prevent members from voting in circumstances where they have missed the officer’s presentation or debate at a single meeting.

The Appellant argued that the right of elected councillors to vote is sacrosanct and can only be restricted by express statutory provision. There are only two express restrictions: where a councillor is aware of a disclosable pecuniary interest (s.31 Localism Act 2011) or has outstanding Council tax (s.106 Local Government and Finance Act 1992). 

The Council and developer argued that the power of local authorities to make standing orders for the “regulation of their proceedings and business” in Sch.12, paragraph 42 of the Local Government Act 1972 embraced a power to restrict voting by councillors. The natural meaning of those words plainly included voting restrictions and there were sound policy reasons why Parliament had legislated to allow local authorities to regulate their proceedings so as to reduce the scope for unlawful decision-making; promote the principles of good administration and public confidence in local authority decision-making.

Hereward Phillpot KC and Isabella Tafur appeared for the First Respondent, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.