In R (Thomas) v London Borough of Lewisham [2026] EWHC 1840 (Admin), handed down on 21 July 2026, Timothy Corner KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed both grounds of challenge.

Ground 1 concerned the interpretation of Local Plan policy HO7 and London Plan policy H15, both of which require PBSA to be "secured for use by students... as demonstrated by an agreement with one or more specific higher education provider(s)." The claimant argued this required a binding nominations agreement with a higher education provider (HEP) to be in place before planning permission could lawfully be granted. The Court rejected that interpretation. Reading the policies in their proper context, including the supporting text, the Mayor's London Plan Guidance on PBSA, and unchallenged evidence as to industry practice, the Court held that HEPs are, in practice, unlikely to commit to nominations agreements until a scheme is well advanced, often not until construction is underway. A requirement for reasonable endeavours to secure a nominations agreement by the point of first occupation, backed by an appropriately drafted section 106 obligation, was sufficient to satisfy the policy. The judgment provides useful clarity on the type and timing of agreement required to demonstrate policy compliance for PBSA schemes, reflecting the commercial realities facing developers and HEPs alike, at a time of significant and growing pressure to deliver student housing across London.

Ground 2 concerned whether the grant of permission was irrational, or tainted by a failure to take account of a material consideration, because by the time permission was issued the existing residential tenants of Scott House had already been evicted, in circumstances where the claimant argued this rendered the relocation strategy secured by Schedule 8 to the section 106 agreement redundant and unenforceable. The Court held that a section 106 obligation is not rendered unlawful, or unenforceable as a matter of principle, simply because it has been substantially performed, or overtaken by events on the ground, by the time permission is granted. The judgment offers a helpful reminder of the distinction between enforceability and a change in factual circumstances, at a time when the drafting and timing of section 106 obligations are increasingly the subject of legal challenge.

A copy of the judgment can be found here.