Supreme Court backs Private Hire Operators in Landmark Uber Challenge

D.E.L.T.A. Merseyside Ltd and another v Uber Britannia Ltd [2025] UKSC 31

The difference between “black cabs” (or hackney carriages) and private hire vehicles is well known. The relevant regulatory context is, however, far from straightforward with the regulation of black cabs predating not just the smartphone but the car itself (as noted in UTAG v TFL [2022] EWCA Civ 1026, [1] (Where David Matthias KC and Charles Streeten represented the Appellant).

D.E.L.T.A. Merseyside Ltd and another v Uber Britannia Ltd [2025] UKSC 31

The difference between “black cabs” (or hackney carriages) and private hire vehicles is well known. The relevant regulatory context is, however, far from straightforward with the regulation of black cabs predating not just the smartphone but the car itself (as noted in UTAG v TFL [2022] EWCA Civ 1026, [1] (Where David Matthias KC and Charles Streeten represented the Appellant).

On 29 July 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Uber's appeal in a case that had put the business model of much of the private hire industry in England and Wales outside London in question.

The dispute was deceptively simple. When a customer books a minicab through an operator, must that operator take on personal responsibility for the journey by contracting directly with the passenger?

Uber said yes — and argued that the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 required every operator outside London to do the same. Many operators do not work that way. Some act as agents for their drivers; others simply undertake to find a driver, leaving the contract to be made at the kerbside. Had Uber succeeded, thousands of operators would have been forced to restructure, with significant consequences for pricing, tax and the wider market.

Lord Briggs, giving the judgment of the Court, held that the 1976 Act does no such thing. Parliament chose to protect the public by (i) licensing vehicles, drivers and operators, and (ii) deeming a contract to be made with the operator who accepted the booking. On Uber's reading, the latter provision would have been redundant. There is no need for a direct contract between the passenger and the operator, because one is deemed to exist under the 1976 in any event. The decision restores certainty to an industry that has operated on these lines for a substantial period of time.

Commenting on the decision, Michael Feeney said “It was a real privilege to be instructed on a case in the Supreme Court at such an early stage of my career. Although the main issue was ultimately a relatively narrow question of statutory construction, the potential consequences of the decision were far-reaching, and it was a brilliant opportunity to see arguments tested at the highest level. It was also a wonderful example of how licensing law extends into many aspects of our daily lives without our knowledge- most people do not think about contractual relationships with operators when they book a private hire vehicle through an app!

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